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Comment
Now You See It, Now You Don't: Defective

Products, the Question of Incorporation and
Liability Insurance
I.

INTRODUCTION

Call it an intriguing little multibillion dollar' insurance riddle: What
constitutes the "property damage" that standard business liability policies cover? Specifically, does merely installing a defective product
cause "property damage" to a larger entity?
These questions arise in the context of Comprehensive General
Liability ("CGL") insurance, the type of liability insurance used most
by U.S. businesses.2 Central to the standard CGL policy is the insurer's promise to pay on behalf of the insured all damages for which the
insured becomes liable because of property damage. 3 This makes the
definition of property damage critical for insurers and insureds alike.
Insurance companies periodically modify the standard CGL form,
and in 19734 they revised the CGL definition of property damage in a
way they insisted would not restrict coverage.5 Nearly unanimously,
1. The figure is taken from Petition for Rehearing With a Suggestion of Rehearing En
Banc of Intervening Defendant Travelers Indemnity Co. of Illinois at 1, Eljer Mfg. Inc.
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 972 F.2d 805 (7th Cir. 1992) (Nos. 91-3203, 91-3251, 913298) (arguing that the issue in that case "potentially implicates billions of dollars of
coverage nationwide").
2. Abex Corp. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 790 F.2d 119, 121 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
3.

S.S. HUEBNER ET AL., PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE 351-52, 360 (3d ed.

1982).
4. The importance today of a form released in 1973 may not be immediately apparent.
Because CGL policies have traditionally covered any accident or "occurrence" that happens while coverage is in effect, an accident that is discovered years after it occurred can
cause an insurer substantial liability under an old policy. See, e.g., Joanne Wojcik, Dow
Coming Sues 73 Insurers: Coverage Denialfor Breast Implant Claims Spurs Massive
Suit, Bus. INS., July 12, 1993, at 2 (discussing 1993 suit by manufacturer of silicone gel
breast implants against insurers that covered its liabilities as far back as 1962).
5. George H. Tinker, Comprehensive General Liability Insurance-Perspectiveand
Overview, 25 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 217, 232-33 (1975). Revisions of standard policies
are normally made by insurance company associations such as Insurance Services Office,
Inc. ("ISO"). For background information on ISO and the CGL revision process, see infra note 37.
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courts disagreed. Both state and federal 6 courts have held that merely
installing a defective product is covered as "property damage" under
the pre-1973 policies, but not under the post-1973 policies.7 Recently,
though, the Seventh Circuit has taken the position that the post-1973
standard forms do afford coverage. 8
This Comment first reviews the nature of CGL insurance and its
coverage of liabilities arising from property damage. 9 Next it presents
and analyzes the orthodox view that incorporation of a defective product does not constitute covered property damage under post-1973 CGL
policies.' ° The Comment concludes that courts and commentators espousing this view have misinterpreted key court decisions and have
6. Even though insurance, as a branch of contract law and specifically under the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1988), is generally a matter of state
law, federal courts can and do play important roles in interpreting standardized insurance
contracts.
Insurance disputes rarely involve questions of federal law. William T. Barker,
Insurance Litigation, Diversity Jurisdiction,and the "DirectAction" Proviso, 35 FED'N
INS. COUN. Q. 225, 225 (1985). But disputes often end up in federal court because one
party or another wants to be there. Id. Diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(1988) is ordinarily available because insurance companies "are usually deemed citizens
only of the states in which they are incorporated and have their principal places of business," and the amounts in controversy often exceed the required $50,000. Id.
Federal courts, in fact, have taken the leading roles in two of the most active areas in
contemporary insurance law. On the question of whether CGL policies cover pollution
liability that is assessed retroactively under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1990) (the
"Superfund" law), federal courts have presided over most of the coverage litigation.
John O'Leary, Coming Full CERCLA: The Release of Superfund Insurance Coverage
Decisions from State Supreme Courts, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Winter 1992, at 31.
Similarly, federal appeals courts have played the leading role in developing theories to
determine which liability insurance policies, if any, will cover asbestos injuries and
property damage. See generally James G. Gilbert, CGL Interpretation and Delayed
Manifestation Disease: Time to Pull the Trigger on Insurer Liability, 38 FED'N INS. &
CORP. COUN. Q. 29 (1987) (discussing the four leading "trigger" theories developed by
the federal courts of appeal).
State courts acknowledge the federal role in interpreting standardized insurance contracts. Some, in fact, rely heavily on federal precedent. See, e.g., Bank of the West v.
Superior Court, 833 P.2d 545, 550 (Cal. 1992). In Bank of the West, the California
Supreme Court reversed a finding of CGL coverage for liability under a California unfair
business practices statute. Id. at 558. To illustrate the seriousness of the lower court's
error, the supreme court cited nine cases ruling to the contrary: six were federal rulings,
including two from federal courts sitting outside California. Id. at 550.
Because otherwise clear jurisdictional lines tend to blur when the subject is standard
insurance policies, this Comment makes liberal use of both federal and state rulings.
7. See infra notes 43-82 and accompanying text.
8. Eljer Mfg., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 972 F.2d 805, 809 (7th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S.Ct. 1646 (1993).
9. See infra parts II and III.
10. See infra parts III and IV.
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overlooked the most reasonable reading of the 1973 CGL policy."
The Comment proposes that based on the "economic loss" rule of tort
law, the post-1973 policies should be construed
to cover defective
'2
product incorporation as "property damage.'
II. BACKGROUND
Liability insurance covers insureds 3 when they become liable or
potentially liable for property damage or bodily injury.' 4 Insurance

companies design general liability policies specifically for businesses. 5 Such policies may cover only one specific risk-e.g.,
premises liability-or a broad range of specified risks. The broadrange policies are called "comprehensive" policies. 16
Liability insurance is rooted in early nineteenth century maritime
law. 17 General liability insurance first gained prominence in the late
1800s.' 8 Initially, insurance companies each drafted their own policies, but by the 1930s confusion and litigation caused by varying policy terms prompted insurance industry trade groups to draft standard
I1. See infra part IV.
12. See infra part V.
1 3. In effect, liability insurance also covers third parties. Though liability coverage
is designed primarily to indemnify the insured for its tort liability to third parties,
courts, legislatures, and the public have also viewed liability insurance as a way to assure ultimate compensation for the third parties. ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS,
INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES
COMMERCIAL PRACTICES 376 (1988).
14. 1 ROWLAND H. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 3.06 (1992).

AND

1 5. The term "general" is used to distinguish the coverage suitable for most businesses from other standard liability forms that specifically cover auto liability, professional liability, or personal liability. HUEBNER, supra note 3, at 369.
16. 1 LONG, supra note 14, § 3.06(1). Comprehensive, though, has a specialized
meaning. "Although it is comprehensive in its liability protection, the extensive list
of exclusions should put one on notice that it is not 'all risks."' HUEBNER, supra note 3,
at 369. But cf., Carl A. Salisbury, Pollution Liability Insurance Coverage, the StandardForm Pollution Exclusion, and the Insurance Industry: A Case Study in Collective
Amnesia, 21 ENVTL. L. 357, 359 n.6 (1991) ("The comprehensive general liability
(CGL) insurance policy was designed to do what its name implies, to insure the
policyholder in a comprehensive way against liability to third persons."); Maria Jo
Aspinwall, Note, The Applicability of General Liability Insurance to Hazardous Waste
Disposal, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 745, 757 (1984) ("The very title 'Comprehensive General
Liability Insurance' suggests the expectation of maximum coverage.")
Although in 1986 the name Comprehensive General Liability was subtly changed to
Commercial General Liability, "CGL" remains the accepted abbreviation. ERIC A.
WIENING & DONALD S. MALECKI, INSURANCE CONTRACT ANALYSIS 61 (1992).

1 7. Early in the 1800s, insurers indemnified vessel owners against losses from damI DONALD S. MALECKI ET AL.,
COMMERCIAL LIABILITY RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 57 (1978).
18. 7A J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4491 (1979).
ages resulting from the collisions of two or more ships.
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policies jointly. 9 The first standard policy, an auto policy, was released in 1935.20
In 1940, in response to a nudge from state insurance regulators, 2'
two insurance company trade groups released the first comprehensive
general liability form.22 This constituted a major breakthrough for
businesses. For the first time, their general liability policies automatically covered new common law and statutory liabilities. 23 Another
unique feature of the CGL policy was that it covered all liability exposures that were not specifically excluded.24 Since 1940, CGL
coverage has come to be the most common type of liability policy for
businesses.25
19. Id. Though some policies, such as certain fire policies, are mandated by statute,
this is not true of most standard policies. Instead, it was insurance regulators who encouraged the trade groups to develop standard policies to add a measure of uniformity and
to serve as a basis of comparison. Roland J. Wendorff, The New Standard
Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policy, 1966 A.B.A. SEC. OF INS., NEGL. &
COMPENSATION LAW 250, 251.
20. Tinker, supra note 5, at 218.
21. Id. at 220.
22. Id.
23. In drafting this form, insurers anticipated expansions of legal liability and developed terms broad enough to cover those expansions automatically. Jordan S. Stanzler &
Charles A. Yuen, Coverage for Environmental Cleanup Costs: History of the Word
"Damages" in the Standard Form Comprehensive General Liability Policy, 3 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 449, 457 (1990).
The advantages of the CGL policy extend beyond coverage for evolving legal liabilities. The policy covers all of an insured's locations and facilities that exist at the time
the coverage is bought, and also automatically covers any facilities and locations added
later. Previous policies did not cover new facilities or locations unless the policy was
altered accordingly. C. ARTHUR WILLIAMS, JR. & RICHARD M. HEINS, RISK MANAGEMENT
AND INSURANCE 354 (5th ed. 1985).
Protection against new exposures, or unknown hazards as they are called, makes CGL
coverage unique and the "most important" form of standard business insurance protection. ROBERT I. MEHR & EMERSON CAMMACK, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE 289 (1980).
24. WILLIAMS & HEINS, supra note 23, at 353. This is not to say that there is any
shortage of exclusions in the CGL policy. The policy contains more exclusions than
most other coverages, in part because it covers more exposures. MALECKI, supra note 17,
at 100.
An insurance executive, circa 1941, explained the newer, more expensive coverage as
follows:
The burden of determining what to insure and what not to insure is removed
from the shoulders of the insured and placed squarely on the producer and the
carrier. How much better it is to say-'We cover everything except this and
this and this' instead of 'We cover only this and this and this.'
Peter J. Kalis & Thomas M. Reiter, Forum Non Conveniens: A Case Management Tool
for Comprehensive Environmental Insurance Coverage Actions?, 92 W. VA. L. REV.
391, 396 n. 19 (1990) (quoting Eglof, Comprehensive Liability Insurance: The Outside,
BEST'S FIRE & CASUALTY NEWS, May 1941, at 19).
25. Robert M. Tyler, Jr. & Todd J. Wilcox, Pollution Exclusion Clauses: Problems in
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Since 1966, general liability policies have come in an "assemblytype" format.2 6 A basic unit, called a "jacket," contains the terms,
conditions and insuring agreements that are common to all policies.
Separate "coverage parts" are added to the jacket to provide any specific coverages a particular insured desires. CGL coverage is one of
these coverage parts. 27
Insurance companies have long tried to implement standard CGL
terms and conditions.28 They have largely succeeded. Standard language promotes price competition3" and fosters useful legal prece-

Interpretation and Application Under the Comprehensive General Liability Policy, 17
IDAHO L. REV. 497, 498 (1981); 1 LONG, supra note 14, § 3.06(1).
26. For explanations of this format, see William R. Fish, An Overview of the 1973
Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policy and Products Liability Coverage, 34
J. Mo. B. 257 (1978); Wendorff, supra note 19, at 251-52; Tinker, supra note 5, at 219.
27. The others are: "Owners, Landlords, and Tenants; Manufacturers and Contractors;
Completed Operations and Products Liability; Contractual Liability (Designated
Contracts); Owners and Contractors Protective Liability (Operations of Designated
Contractor); Premises Medical Payments; Storekeepers Liability; Druggists Liability;
Comprehensive Personal Liability; and Farm Employers Liability and Farm Employees'
Medical Payments." HUEBNER, supra note 3, at 356. The CGL part is considered the best
for covering business liability exposures because its coverage is broader than that
afforded by the other parts. MEHR & CAMMACK, supra note 23, at 286.
28. "Standard" simply means that the identical language is used regardless of the insurer. "For example, the same standard liability policy written by an insurer of a hotel
in Kentucky can be used by another insurer of a hotel in Arizona. In each instance, the
'basic' standard provisions of these two policies ... are the same." MALECKI, supra note
17, at 83.
Several prominent insurance company associations recently described the importance
of standard forms to the Supreme Court:
Standardized insurance policy forms are critical to the accurate pricing of the
insurance product. Without standard definitions of risk, it would be impossible
for the industry to pool the data on past losses that is crucial for ratemaking.
In enacting the [McCarran-Ferguson] Act, [the 1945 law exempting insurers
from key federal antitrust laws] Congress thus regarded industry cooperation
on rates and forms as inseparable and essential: "Uniformity as to rates, forms
of policies and the like, is not only desirable in insurance, but is necessary."
Standardized coverage terms are also at "the core of the 'business of insurance'
because they determine "the type of policy which could be issued, [and] its reliability, interpretation and enforcement." In short, the insurance industry
"could not cease to use standard forms without at the same time ceasing to be
an insurance business."
Brief of American Insurance Association, National Association of Independent Insurers,
National Council on Compensation Insurance, and the Surety Association of America as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct.
2891 (1993) (No. 91-1111), LEXIS at *4 (citations omitted)(second alteration in original)[hereinafter Brief of American Insurance Association]; see also KEETON & WIDISS,
supra note 13, at 118-25 (discussing standardization in greater detail).
29. Fish, supra note 26, at 257.
30. Brief of American Insurance Association, supra note 28.
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dent. 3' Even standardized language, however, fails to allow for new
legal, commercial, or social developments, so the insurance industry
periodically revises its standard forms. The industry revised the CGL
form in 1943, 1947, 1955, 1966, 1973, and 1986.32 Not all these revisions brought about broad or fundamental changes. Definitions and
conditions were frequently carried over basically intact from one form
to the next.3 3 Insurance companies have revised the CGL form for 34
a
range of purposes, including: countering adverse court rulings;
meeting the demands of insurance buyers;35 and clarifying ambiguities.3 6 Today, revisions are made by an insurance
company associa37
tion, the Insurance Services Office, Inc. ("ISO").
3 1. Tinker, supra note 5, at 219.
3 2. Stanzler & Yuen, supra note 23, at 450.
33. For example, the 1966 and 1973 forms are quite similar in their treatment of
products liability. Fish, supra note 26, at 257-58.
34. John J. Tarpey, The New Comprehensive Policy: Some of the Changes, 33 INS.
COUNS. J.223, 223 (1966) ("The principle reason given for [the 1966] revision of the
[CGL] policies was adverse court decisions."); Tinker, supra note 5, at 222 n. 10 ("A decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court was a prime factor in inducing the 1966 revision[s].").
35. All standard policies from 1935 to 1966 used the phrase "caused by accident" in
the insuring agreement. But customers had been requesting, and often receiving, broader
"occurrence"-based coverage for years. ISO broadened the definition of "accident" in the
1966 revision to encompass certain occurrences. Tinker, supra note 5, at 254-57.
36. For example, ISO revised the form in 1973 partly to clarify which insurance policy would cover certain claims that spanned the periods covered by several different
policies. Medard M. Narko, The 1972 Comprehensive General Liability Policy:
Response to a Continuing Need, 61 ILL. B. J.34, 35 (1972) (The reference in the title of
this article to the "1972" CGL policy indicates the author expected a new policy would
be released in 1972 and not in 1973 as it actually was.).
37. In a recent Supreme Court antitrust ruling, Justice Souter provided some background information on ISO:
Defendant Insurance Services Office, Inc. (ISO), an association of approximately 1,400 domestic property and casualty insurers . . . is the almost
exclusive source of support services in this country for CGL insurance. ISO
develops standard policy forms and files or lodges them with each State's insurance regulators; most CGL insurance written in the United States is written
on these forms .... For each of its standard policy forms, ISO also supplies
actuarial and rating information: it collects, aggregates, interprets, and distributes data on the premiums charged, claims filed and paid, and defense costs
expended with respect to each form, and on the basis of this data it predicts future loss trends and calculates advisory premium rates. Most ISO members
cannot afford to continue to use a form if ISO withdraws these support services.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2896-97 (1993) (citations
omitted).
Ratemaking by trade associations or bureaus is one insurance company activity that is
exempt from the federal antitrust laws under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. See supra note
28. Economic efficiency and public policy are frequently cited as reasons for this exemp-
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DISCUSSION

"PropertyDamage" Coverage

This Comment focuses on a particular revision to the standard CGL
policy, the change in the definition of "property damage" between the
1966 and 1973 CGL forms.
Recall that a liability policy covers the insured business's liability
for property damage.38 So to obtain coverage, an insured must prove
property damage. From the original version through the 1955 versions, CGL policies did not define "property damage. 3 9 Then, in
1966, the industry expanded the definitions section of the policy to
state: "'Property'
damage means injury to or destruction of tangible
40
property. 9
In 1973, ISO revised the property damage definition, splitting it into
two parts: one covering damage that includes "physical injury to...
tangible property," and the other limited to "loss of use" unaccompanied by physical injury.4 Virtually the same definition appears in the
tion:
Bureau operations have been defended on the ground that they produce more
credible statistical data for rate making, they make available a group of highly
qualified experts at minimum cost, and, to the extent that they require adherence to their rates, they reduce the possibility of cutthroat competition, unfair
discrimination, and insolvency.
The disadvantages of unbridled competition are considered especially important in insurance because, if insurers become insolvent, they will be unable to
fulfill their promises to their insureds. Such competition is possible in insurance because the price is based on an estimate, and the insurer may be unduly
optimistic in its attempts to meet competition.
WILLIAMS & HEINS, supra note 23, at 582-83; see also MEHR & CAMMACK, supra note 23,
at 616-17 (describing cooperative ratemaking as "equitable and economical").
38. 1 LONG, supra note 14, § 3.06(1).
39. Under the original and 1943 versions of the CGL policy, insurers agreed to pay:
[O]n behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become obligated to
pay by reason of the liability imposed upon him by law, or assumed by him
under contract as defined herein, for damages because of injury to or destruction of property, including the loss of use thereof, caused by accident.
Standard Provisions for General Liability Policies Including Instructions for Preparation
of Policies by Individual Companies, Comprehensive Liability Form (Jan. 20, 1941)
(quoted in Stanzler & Yuen, supra note 23, at 450 n.5) (emphasis omitted).
Under the 1947 and 1955 forms, insurers agreed to pay "on behalf of the insured all
sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of injury to or destruction of property, including the loss of use thereof, caused by accident."
Stanzler & Yuen, supra note 23, at 450-51 n.5.
40. Alfred E. Reichenberger, Defense Research Inst., Inc., General Liability
Insurance: 1973 Revisions 8 (1974) [hereinafter DRI].
4 1. Specifically, the definition stated:
"Property damage" means (1) physical injury to or destruction of tangible
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1986 form. 4 2 Thus, all post-1973 standard CGL policies contain the
1973 definition, which limits covered property damage, other than loss
of use damage, to that accompanied by "physical injury."
B. Incorporationof a Defective Productas Property Damage Under
Pre-1973Policies
The prevailing view is that under pre-1973 CGL policies, incorporation of a defective product constitutes covered property damage.43
Two 1950's state supreme court decisions are the leading cases supporting this proposition." Because they are still cited today,45 these
decisions are worth examining in some detail.
In Hauenstein v. St. Paul Mercury-Indemnity Co. ,46 a distributor
sold a new type of plaster to numerous contractors.47 Once applied,
the plaster shrank and cracked, but did not otherwise damage the
buildings in which it was installed. 48 The contractors were forced to
remove the defective plaster and redo their work.49 One contractor
sued the distributor, which in turn sought indemnity under the CGL
policy provision covering liability for property damage.5
The insurer denied coverage, contending in part that the plaster had
damaged only the distributor's own goods and not the buildings in
property which occurs during the policy period, including the loss of use
thereof at any time resulting therefrom, or (2) loss of use of tangible property
which has not been physically injured or destroyed provided such loss of use is
caused by an occurrence during the policy period.
Id. at 10.
42. Under the 1986 form, "[p]roperty damage means: a. Physical injury to tangible
property, including all resulting loss of use of that property; or b. Loss of use of tangible property that is not physically injured." JAMES A. ROBERTSON, ISO COMMERCIAL
LIABILrrY FORMS: A SIDE-BY-SIDE COMPARISON 40 (4th ed. 1986).
43. See infra notes 66-82 and accompanying text.
44. For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 46-59 and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Vieira, 930 F.2d 696, 698 (9th Cir. 1991);
Capitol Reprod. Inc. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 800 F.2d 617, 622 (6th Cir. 1986); American
Home Assur. v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 786 F.2d 22, 25 (1st Cir. 1986); Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Mclbs, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 246, 248 (D. Nev. 1988), aff'd, 878
F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1989); Hawaiian Ins. & Guar. Co. v. Blair, Ltd., 726 P.2d 1310, 1314
(Haw. Ct. App. 1986); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. M. & S. Indus. Inc., 827 P.2d 321,
325 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
46. 65 N.W.2d 122 (Minn. 1954).
47. Id. at 124.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. The court did not specify which form the insurer used. The policy language
quoted by the court, defining property damage as "injury to or destruction of property,
including the loss of use thereof, caused by accident," is consistent with the 1940,
1943, and 1947 standard forms. See supra note 39.
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which it was incorporated, and therefore had not caused "property
damage."' In a passage that has since confounded courts and practitioners, the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected this argument, concluding that because the incorporation of the defective plaster had diminished the value of the building, that incorporation constituted property
damage. 52 The Hauenstein court, however, did not make clear
whether diminished market value was itself property damage, or rather
merely a measure
of damages. Courts have since resolved this ques53
tion both ways.
In the second case, Geddes & Smith Inc. v. Saint Paul-Mercury
Indemnity Co., aluminum doors began to warp and malfunction
shortly after being sold to a contractor who installed them in houses.
The contractor sued the door supplier for negligence and breach of
warranty, and the supplier in turn sought indemnity under its CGL
policy. 56 As in Hauenstein, the insurer denied coverage, stressing that
5 1. Hauenstein, 65 N.W.2d at 124. A separate standard policy provision excluded
coverage for "any goods or products manufactured, sold, handled, or distributed by the
[i]nsured." Id.
52. The Hauenstein court stated:
It is undisputed that after this new type of plaster had been applied it shrunk
and cracked to such an extent that it was of no value and had to be removed so
that the walls and ceilings could be replastered with a different material. No
one can reasonably contend that the application of a useless plaster, which
has to be removed before the walls can be properly replastered, does not lower
the market value of a building. Although the injury to the walls and ceilings
can be rectified by removal of the defective plaster, nevertheless, the presence
of the defective plaster on the walls and ceilings reduced the value of the building and constituted property damage. The measure of damages is the diminution in the market value of the building, or the cost of removing the defective
plaster and restoring the building to its former condition plus any loss from
deprival of use, whichever is the lesser.
Id. at 125.
53. Compare Wyoming Sawmills Inc. v. Transp. Ins., Co., 578 P.2d 1253, 1256 (Or.
1978) (holding that diminution in value is damage) with Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v.
Olson Bros., Inc., 188 N.W.2d 699, 705 (Neb. 1971) (holding that it was the incorporation itself that constituted the damage and stating that "[Hauenstein] is one of a number
of similar cases in which a supplier's product was incorporated into a structure and because it was defective there was damage to the work into which the product was incorporated"). The Wyoming Sawmills court stated:
[Hauenstein and its progeny] hold that despite the lack of physical damage to
the larger entity into which the defective product has been integrated, the
value of the larger entity has been depreciated by the defective product which
has been integrated into it, and that such depreciation in value constitutes
'property damage.'
Wyoming Sawmills, 578 P.2d at 1256 (emphasis added).
54. 334 P.2d 881 (Cal. 1959).
55. Id. at 882.
56. The policy in Geddes & Smith, like that in Hauenstein, covered damages imposed

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 25

the only damage was to the insured's own goods. 57 Rejecting this argument, Justice Traynor relied upon Hauenstein to support the
proposition that the houses themselves were damaged by the incorporation of the defective doors.58
After insurance companies added the definition of "property damage" to the CGL form in 1966, courts quickly applied Hauenstein and
Geddes & Smith to conclude that under that definition, incorporation
of a defective product constituted "property damage. ',' By 1973, this
construction was so dominant 60 that the Ninth Circuit termed the incorporation issue "well-settled."'6 But the issue proved less settled
than the Ninth Circuit maintained.
C. Turning the Tables: No Coverage of IncorporationUnder Post1973 Policies

In 1973, ISO issued a new CGL form to replace the 1966 form.
For the most part, the 1966 and 1973 CGL forms were quite similar,

"because of injury to or destruction of property, including the loss of use thereof, caused
by accident." Id. at 882-83.
57. Geddes & Smith, 334 P.2d at 884.
58. Id. at 885.
59. See, e.g., Goodyear Rubber & Supply Co. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 471 F.2d 1343
(9th Cir. 1973) (holding that incorporating defective hatch gaskets into a ship constituted property damage); Western Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Polar Panel Co., 457 F.2d 957
(8th Cir. 1972) (holding that installation of solar insulation panels that later developed
unsightly blisters constituted property damage); Bowman Steel Corp. v. Lumbermens
Mut. Casualty Co., 364 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1966) (holding that bonding asbestos felt to
steel sheets caused property damage under pre-1966 policies that used the definition
which would become standard in 1966); Sturges Mfg. Co. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 332
N.E.2d 319 (N.Y. 1975) (holding that defective ski straps damaged bindings when
incorporated); Thomas J. Lipton Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 314 N.E.2d 37 (N.Y.
1974) (holding that contaminated noodles damaged soups when incorporated); Gulf Ins.
Co. v. Parker Products, Inc., 498 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. 1973) (holding that coffee and
lemon candy mixes that contained paper damaged 4,696 gallons of ice cream when
incorporated).
60. This position was dominant but not unanimous. See, e.g. Hamilton Die Cast,
Inc. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 508 F.2d 417, 418-19 (7th Cir. 1975) (holding
that although defective frames forced sporting goods firm to refund money for its tennis
rackets there was no "property damage" under 1966 form definition); Dreis & Krump
Mfg. Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 548 F.2d 681, 686 (7th Cir. 1977) (following Hamilton
Die Cast).
6 1. Specifically, the court stated:
Under well-settled principles, when one product is integrated into a larger entity and the product proves defective, the damage is considered as damage to
the entity to the extent that the market value of the entity is reduced by an
amount in excess of the value of the defective product.
Goodyear, 471 F.2d at 1344.
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differences being largely limited to the definitions sections. 62 Still,
even those ostensibly minor changes generated concern among more
cynical insureds.63 The insurers maintained, however, that the new
property damage definition in the 1973 form only clarified their
intended scope" of property damage coverage, rather than restricting
coverage.65 Yet courts quickly and nearly unanimously disagreed.
62. Fish, supra note 26, at 257-58. Both "bodily injury" and "property damage" were
redefined in the 1973 policy. Bodily harm was defined in the 1966 policy as "bodily injury, sickness or disease sustained by any person." DRI, supra note 40, at 7. The 1973
form defined bodily harm as "bodily injury, sickness or disease sustained by any person
which occurs during the policy period, including death at any time resulting therefrom."
Id. at 8.
For discussion of the 1973 form's changed "property damage" definition, see supra
notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
63. See, e.g., Leslie Murray, Risk Men Express Need for Caution on New CGL
Changes, Bus. INS., Jan. 1, 1973, at 1. Commenting on the 1973 CGL changes, an
Illinois official who bought insurance for the state said: "The changes in the 1966 policy were publicized 'purely editorial,' but that wasn't necessarily true. You can always be
sure the carriers have something in the back of their grubby little minds." Id.
64. The question of what scope of coverage the parties intended is a principal focus in
insurance coverage litigation. As Judge Coffin explained:
Insurance policies are generally interpreted the same way as other contracts.
In construing the policies at issue, our dominant purpose is to give effect to
the intention of the parties. Where the relevant language is unambiguous and
the application of the policy to the relevant facts is clear, that intent must be
ascertained by the plain and ordinary meaning of the contract language.
Where, however, the policy terms are ambiguous and the coverage issue is
reasonably disputed, a court may consider extrinsic evidence of the surrounding circumstances and of the parties' intent. For example, evidence of the
construction given to the language by the parties and of the customary usage
of persons in the same commercial setting is normally admissible. If the
meaning of the policy terms remains unclear, the policy is generally construed
in favor of the insured in order to promote the policy's objective of providing
coverage.
Eagle-Picher Industries Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 1982)
(citation omitted).
Intent of the parties has been referred to as the "polar star" of insurance contract interpretation. APPLEMAN, supra note 18, § 7385 at 110.
The intent and meaning of the parties is far more important than the strict and
literal sense of the words used in the contract. For that reason it is equally important to consider the subject matter of insurance and the purpose or object
which the parties had in view at the time ....
Id. at 126-27.
To the extent that it can be ascertained, the intent of those who drafted the policy is often considered probative of the intent of the parties. See infra note 65.
65. As one contemporary commentator, himself an insurance company lawyer, explained:
This 1973 version is designed to clarify the intent that "property damage"
includes the loss of use of tangible property which itself has not been physically injured or destroyed. The 1966 edition defined "property damage" as
meaning "injury to or destruction of tangible property." And the word "dam-
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In Wyoming Sawmills, Inc. v. TransportationInsurance Co., 66 the
first major ruling on the 1973 definition, the Oregon Supreme Court
held that incorporation of defective two-by-four studs into a new
building was not "property damage. '67 The studs had warped and had
to be replaced, but they had not otherwise damaged any part of the
building. 68 The insured relied on Hauenstein and its progeny for the
proposition that incorporation of a defective product constitutes property damage to the larger entity. 69 Relying exclusively on the new
definition, the court rejected that argument, stressing that the term
"physical," which appeared in the 1973 but not the 1966 form, excluded coverage for diminution in value. 70 The court cited no authority
for this interpretation.
In the next major decision interpreting the new definition of "property damage," the Minnesota Supreme Court revisited the Hauenstein
ages" was defined to include "damages for loss of use of property resulting
from 'property damage."' Since "property damage" meant injury to tangible
property there was room for construction that the policy would cover damages
for loss of use only as to the tangible property which was itself physically injured. That was not the intent ....
There was also the possibility of construing "injury" unqualified by the word
"physical" to include non-physical or intangible injury, such as loss of use,
so that the definition of property damage would itself include the loss of use of
the building in the illustration without any help from the "damages" definition. While that construction might provide a short-cut to intended coverage
[in a particular example] it does violence to rules of construction and would do
violence to intent of coverage in other types of cases. If this construction
were followed, that portion of the "damages" definition which relates to the
loss of use of property would be meaningless, whereas the rule of construction
presumes that all of the terms of the contract have meaning and are included for
a purpose.
The 1973 definition of property damage clarifies this area of confusion both
as respects injury, which is now qualified by the word "physical" and by expressly including within the definition of "property damage" loss of use of
tangible property which has not itself been physically injured if the loss of
use is caused by an "occurrence" (as defined) during the policy period.
The filing memorandum written by the Insurance Services Office to the various state insurance departments notes that this change in definition is designed to be a clarification of intent, and not a change in intent.
Tinker, supra note 5, at 232-33.
66. 578 P.2d 1253 (Or. 1978).
67. Id. at 1256.
68. Id. at 1255-56.
69. Id. at 1256.
70. The Wyoming Sawmills court commented that "[tihe inclusion of ['physical']
negates any possibility that the policy was intended to include 'consequential or intangible damage,' such as depreciation in value, within the term 'property damage.' The intention to exclude such coverage can be the only reason for the addition of the word." Id.
(footnote omitted).
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question in FederatedMutual Insurance Co. v. Concrete Units, Inc.
In Concrete Units, concrete used in constructing a grain elevator hardened improperly and had to be removed. 72 Both the owner of the elevator and a contractor on the project sued the concrete supplier,73
which then sought indemnity under a CGL policy containing the 1973
definition.74 As had the Wyoming Sawmills court, the Concrete Units

court held that incorporation of a defective product did not constitute
property damage under the new definition.75
Of the many other courts that have followed suit, 76 perhaps none did
so as affirmatively as the Tenth Circuit in Hartford Accident &
Indemnity Co. v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. 77 In Hartford,a
bankrupt contractor had installed a faulty glass wall curtain system in a
new building.78 After window units began to break and their reflective
coating began to deteriorate, the contractor sought coverage under two
general liability policies: a primary policy which used the 1966 definition of property damage, and an excess policy 79 which used the 1973
definition. 8' The court found "property damage" coverage under the
1966 definition, but no such coverage under the 1973 definition.8'
Currently, then, the weight of authority holds that incorporation of a
7 1. 363 N.W.2d 751 (Minn. 1985).
72. Id. at 753.
73. Id. at 754. Among the damages sought were repair expenses, lost profits from
other work the contractor could have been doing had there been no delays, and loss of
use of the storage space. Id.
74. Id. at 755.
75. Concrete Units, 363 N.W.2d at 756. The concrete supplier's "loss of use" claims
were covered. Id. at 756-57.
76. See, e.g., New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Vieira, 930 F.2d 696, 700 (9th Cir. 1991)
(holding that incorrect installation of drywall that later had to be repaired and
strengthened is not property damage under the 1973 definition); Millers Mut. Fire Ins.
v. Ed Bailey Inc., 647 P.2d 1249, 1251-53 (Idaho 1982) (holding that installation of
polyurethane foam that contributed to fire in storage facility is not property damage under 1973 definition).
77. 861 F.2d 250 (10th Cir. 1988).
78. Id. at 252.
79. Excess policies provide coverage above the limits of other, primary policies.
MEHR & CAMMACK, supra note 23, at 295. For example, corporation X may have a primary liability policy from one insurance company that covers liability for damages up
to $50 million. An excess insurer might sell corporation X an excess policy covering,
for example, liability over $50 million and up to $100 million.
80. Hartford Acc. & Indemnity Co., 861 F.2d at 252-54.
8 1. The court noted:
[T]he 1966 version of 'property damage' has been construed to include diminution in value as well as physical injury and loss of use .... [The 1973 revision] was intended to preclude coverage for intangible injuries such as
diminution in value.
Id. at 254.
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defective product is not property damage under the 1973 definition.82
As evidenced by a recent decision of the Seventh Circuit, however,
this may be changing.
D. The Eljer View of the Post-1973 Policies
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in Eljer
Manufacturing, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,83 recently contradicted the prevailing view by drawing upon tort law, economic
theory, and CGL drafting history to conclude that incorporation of a
defective product is itself covered "property damage" under the 1973
definition. 84 In Eljer, the manufacturer of leak-prone 8 pipes sought
82. Cases involving the presence of one highly toxic product-asbestos-in buildings form a narrow exception to this general rule. For reasons explained below, these
"asbestos-in-building" cases are distinguishable from other defective product incorporation cases and are not considered extensively herein.
Among the most common asbestos-containing materials installed in buildings are
sound-proofing and insulation. Mark E. Wojcik, Tracing the Fibers of Asbestos
Litigation: When Do an Insurer's Duties of Defense and Indemnity Arise? 36 FED'N. INS.
COUN. Q. 283, 285 (Spring 1986). When such materials are "friable"-that is, when dry
they can be crumbled, pulverized or reduced to powder by hand pressure-they release asbestos fibers in the air. Id. at 288. Any exposure to these fibers is unsafe. Id. at 286.
Therefore, the very presence of asbestos fibers (unlike leaky pipes or cracking plaster)
constitutes a "physical injury" compensable under tort law. See Adams Arapahoe School
Dist. No. 28-J v. GAF Corp., 959 F.2d 868, 872 (10th Cir. 1989); City of Greenville v.
W.R. Grace & Co., 827 F.2d 975, 977-78 (4th Cir. 1987); United States Fid. & Guar.
Co. v. Wilkin Insulation Co., 578 N.E.2d 926, 931 (I11.1991).
Even the terminology used in these cases is instructive. Rather than speaking of "incorporation" of asbestos into a building, courts refer to the "contamination" of the
building by asbestos. Adams-Arapahoe. 959 F.2d at 872; City of Greenville, 827 F.2d
at 978; Wilkin, 578 N.E.2d at 931. Because contamination damages the buildings, asbestos installation is a physical injury.
Outside the context of asbestos, at least five cases, some already cited herein, support
the proposition that diminution in value claims are not covered under the 1973 definition. These cases are collected in BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN,
HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES 226 (1992). Ostrager and Newman cite
only Missouri Terrazzo Co. v. Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 740 F.2d 647, 650 (8th Cir.
1984) for the alternative proposition.
83. 972 F.2d 805 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1646 (1993).
84. Id. at 813-14. Recently the Second Circuit followed Eljer in Maryland Casualty
Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., No. 91-9322, 1993 WL 335115 (2d Cir. Sept. 1, 1993). Two
district courts have also done so. See Johnson v. Studyvin, Nos. 92-2292, 92-2430,
1993 WL 294444 (D. Kan. July 28, 1993); Colonial Gas Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur.
Co., 823 F. Supp. 975 (D. Mass. 1993).
Admittedly, there is one far more pedestrian factor that may have played a role in Eljer:
The stakes were simply much higher than in many of the previous cases involving incorporation of defective products. The manufacturer projected a tort liability of several
hundred million dollars, most of which it hoped to recover from insurance proceeds.
Eljer, 972 F.2d at 807. By contrast, Young v. Insurance Co. of North America, 870 F.2d
610, 610 (11th Cir. 1989), involved a claim for $350,000; New Hampshire Ins. Co. v.
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coverage for homeowners' suits under several excess and primary liability policies, all of which used the 1973 definition of property damage.86 Some of the homeowners had suffered leaks; others had not,
but claimed the value of their property had been diminished by the
presence of the potentially defective system.81 In cases in which the
pipes had leaked during the policy period,8 8 the insurers did not contest coverage. 89 But predictably, for cases in which the pipes did not
actually leak during the policy period, the insurers denied coverage on
the basis of lack of the "physical injury" required by the 1973 definition of property damage.'
Writing for the court, Judge Posner characterized the case as an ar-9
gument over two competing definitions of the term "physical injury." 1
He posited that insurers favor a definition that emphasizes "physical,"
which connotes injury that causes a physical alteration to the thing injured.92 He observed that insureds, on the other hand, would like a
definition that gives greater prominence to "injury," which connotes
loss that results from some physical contact. 93 Finding it more compatible with the aims of the CGL drafters 94 and the nature of insurance
Vieira, 930 F.2d 696, 697 (9th Cir. 1991), involved a claim for $300,000; and
Wyoming Sawmills v. Transp. Ins. Co., 578 P.2d 1253, 1255 (Or. 1978), involved a
claim for roughly $17,000. Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Concrete Units Inc., 363 N.W.2d
751 (Minn. 1985) does not indicate how much was at stake. For an interesting account
of how closely the financial world monitors the legal one, see Robert Hurtado, Market
Place: Eyes Are on Eljer As It Wins Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1992, at D8.
85. An estimated 5 percent of these particular plumbing systems failed. Eljer, 972
F.2d at 807. For criticism of the Eljer court for not setting specific standards on failure
rates for courts to use in discerning which products are defective, see Michael J. Sehr et
al., Insurance Coverage Litigation: Recent Developments, 28 TORT & INS. L.J. 333,
345-46 (1993).
86. Eljer, 972 F.2d at 807.
87. Id.
88. The policy period is the time during which the policy is in effect. Most standard
policies require only that the onset of damages occur during this time. MEHR &
CAMMACK, supra note 23, at 161-62.
89. Eljer, 972 F.2d at 808.
90. Id. For that proposition, the insurers cited many of the federal appeals court rulings previously mentioned as well as cases construing New York and Illinois law, each
of which governed some of the policies involved in Eljer. Brief and Appendix for
Intervening Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant Travelers Indemnity Co. of Illinois at
8-16, Eljer Mfg. Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 972 F.2d 805 (7th Cir. 1992) (Nos. 913203, 91-3251,91-3298).
91. Eljer, 972 F.2d at 810.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See id. at 810-11. Neither the insurers, nor the plaintiff manufacturer, nor Judge
Posner provided first-hand drafting history evidence of the drafters' intent. The insurers
asserted that the manufacturer had waived any drafting history arguments by not raising
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coverage,95 the court opted for the insureds' preferred definition.96
Thus the Eljer court9 7 held that under the 1973 definition, incorporation can itself be property damage if there is physical contact.98
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Why Did ISO Make the 1973 Change?
Certainly, the intent of ISO, the policy drafters, has some bearing
on the meaning of the 1973 property damage definition. But rarely is
it entirely clear why insurers change policy language. 99 Nonetheless,
them at trial. Brief for Travelers, supra note 90, at 8-16. The insurers relied on many of
the earlier rulings cited herein to establish the meaning of the 1973 definition. Id.
Judge Posner maintained that the meaning can be reliably ascertained by examining the
policy language itself and the economic principles that drive the insurance market.
Eljer, 972 F.2d at 808-09.
95. ElIjer, 972 F.2d at 808-09.
96. Id. at 813-14.
97. In dissent, Judge Cudahy stated that if Illinois had not spoken on the incorporation issue, he might have agreed with the majority that installation of a defective product is property damage. Id. at 817 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). Although the majority
characterized Illinois case law as "unclear," Judge Cudahy concluded that under Illinois
law the 1973 policy does not cover incorporation damage. Id. at 812, 815 (Cudahy, J.,
dissenting).
He relied primarily on United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Wilkin Insulation Co., 578
N.E.2d 926 (Il1. 1991). In Wilkin, the court held that the installation of materials
containing asbestos into buildings constituted physical injury to tangible property. Id.
at 931. Conceding that the Wilkin opinion is not a "model of clarity," Judge Cudahy
maintained that the Wilkin court implicitly rejected the general contention that incorporation of defective products is property damage, while actually basing its ruling on the
particularly toxic nature of asbestos contamination. Elier, 972 F.2d at 816 (Cudahy, J.,
dissenting).
Judge Posner charged that Wilkin could not be relied on for its incorporation holding
because the reasoning of the underlying appellate ruling was unclear and the supreme
court did not clarify precisely what in the appellate opinion it was repudiating. Id. at
813.
98. Id. at 810-12, 814. In Eljer, the "physical contact" was the actual installation of
the defective plumbing systems into homes. Id. at 810. "Incorporation" itself seems to
presuppose some physical contact. See id. at 814 (stating that "the incorporation of a
defective product into another product inflicts physical injury") (emphasis added).
99. An insurance company described the difficulty of ascertaining insurance industry
intent as follows:
Because of the way the insurance industry operates, most of the relevant policy language is found in standardized insuring forms, drafted by insurance
associations or bureaus, and used industry-wide. Thus, questions of intent may
be addressed on a standardized basis. Predictably, there will be precious little
evidence of the negotiation of individual policies. The primary evidence on
the intent of the parties drafting the contracts, and their expectations about
scope of coverage, will be obtained through document productions from key
industry-wide organizations, and depositions of their personnel.
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many courts claim to knowprecisely why ISO altered the property
damage definition in 1973.' 00 Commentators seem a bit less unanimous,' ° ' but the consensus is that the new definition was intended to
eliminate coverage for liability arising from incorporation of defective
products.
Yet, generally, ISO sought to "clarify," not restrict, the then-existing scope of coverage for property damage.' 0 2 More specifically, one
court that examined the background of the 1973 CGL policy at length
concluded that its drafters expressed no intent to eliminate coverage for
damage from incorporation of defective products.'0 3 Some commentators agree.U°4 Thus, there is some question regarding whether ISO inStanzler & Yuen, supra note 23, at 449 n. 1, (quoting Travelers' Reply Memorandum In
Support of Coordination at 7-8 (filed Jan. 2, 1981), Armstrong Cork Co. v. Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co. (No. C 31567), consolidated into Asbestos Ins. Coverage Cases,
Judicial Council Coord. Proceeding No. 1072 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 24, 1990)).
Documents revealing industry intent are not always easy to come by. See, e.g.,
Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 623 A.2d 1099 (Del. Super. Ct.
1991). In Hoechst, the insured requested discovery of CGL drafting history and other
documents. Id. at 1106. The insurer argued that such documents were extraneous because
the policy was unambiguous, and raised objections including vagueness, overbreadth,
burden, attorney-client privilege, work-product doctrine, and the protection given to
proprietary business data. Id. Ultimately, though, the court granted the discovery
request. Id. at 1117.
100. See, e.g., American Home Assur. Co. v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 786 F.2d 22,
25 (1st Cir. 1986) (stating that "[t]he critical difference in policy language is the result
of a 1973 revision of the Comprehensive General Liability Policy, used by most insurance companies, which expressly added the modifier 'physical' injury to the definition of
'property damage' in order to restrict recovery for intangible losses"); Wyoming
Sawmills, Inc. v. Transportation Ins. Co., 578 P.2d 1253, 1256 (Or. 1978) ("The
inclusion of [physical] negates any possibility that the policy was intended to include .
• . depreciation in value, within the term 'property damage.' The intention to exclude
such coverage can be the only reason for the addition of the word.").
101. For an interpretation that the 1966 definition permitted diminution in value
claims but the "narrower" 1973 definition did not, see Laurie Vasichek, Note, Liability
Coveragefor "DamagesBecause of Property Damage" Under the Comprehensive General
Liability Policy, 68 MINN. L. REV. 795, 809-12 (1984).
For an interpretation more favorable to insurance companies, namely that insurers
meant to exclude coverage for consequential and intangible damages under the 1966 policy, but court rulings caused confusion which insurers tried to eliminate with the 1973
definition, see Narko, supra note 36, at 35.
102. See Tinker, supra note 5, at 232-33; Narko, supra note 36, at 34.
103. See Reply Brief and Response to Cross-Appeals for Plaintiff-Appellant/CrossAppellee Eljer Manufacturing Co. at 10, Eljer Mfg. Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 972
F.2d 805 (7th Cir. 1992) (Nos. 91-3203, 91-3251, 91-3298) (citing Asbestos Insurance
Coverage Cases, Phase V-A, No. 1072 n.12 at 2 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Jan. 24, 1990), as
positing that the drafting history of the CGL "indicates that the physical injury requirement was added to eliminate coverage for intangible losses. The drafters were not
seeking to restrict coverage for defective product claims.").
104. See, e.g., Kirk A. Pasich, Insurance Coverage for Asbestos Building Cases:
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tended the 1973 definition to eliminate incorporation damage coverage.
Perhaps the answer lies not in what insurers did or declared, but in
what they have not done. Although they have had ample opportunity
to protest and change the coverage of incorporation damage, they have
not done so.
Recall that until the 1973 form, nothing in the CGL definition of
property damage conditioned coverage on physical injury. 0 5 That
nonrestrictive language led to excessive coverage obligations.' 6 In response, some insurers attempted to establish that even under pre-1973
policies, property damage coverage was limited to physical damage to
tangible property.'0 7 Yet during the same time, the insurance industry
said little about coverage for incorporation of defective products.' ° In
fact, by 1973 courts had been ruling that incorporation constituted
property damage for nearly two decades, but the insurers did not
affirmatively exclude coverage for such damage in the 1973 form.
Insurers, of course, know how to exclude coverage:'09 Exclusions are
There's More Than Property Damage, 24 TORT & INS. L. J. 630, 640 (1989) ("In addition, the drafting history of the 1973 CGL policy, which expressly treats loss of use as
property damage, shows that the drafters intended to clarify, not change, the coverage
provided." (citation omitted)).
105. See McDowell-Wellman Eng'g Co. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 711 F.2d
521, 525-26 n.7 (3d Cir. 1983) (stating that "the term property damage [in the 1966
policy] does not require actual physical damage but can include intangible damage");
Continental Casualty Co. v. Gilbane Bldg. Co., 461 N.E.2d 209, 212-13 (Mass. 1984)
("There is nothing in the definition [of property damage] requiring physical injury or destruction of property. The guide to determination of coverage is the kind of property
rather than the kind of injury." (citation omitted)); WILLARD J. OBRIST, The New
Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policy-A Coverage Analysis in DRI, supra
note 40, at 40 (1974) ("The new (1966) definition omits any requirement of physical
injury as a prerequisite for coverage.").
106. See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Northern Grain Co., 365 F.2d 361,
366 (8th Cir. 1966) (holding that wheat crop was injured by sale to farmer of a type of
seed that was less productive than the type actually sought); Wells Labberton v. General
Casualty Co. of Am., 332 P.2d 250, 255 (Wash. 1958) (holding that production lost
when a defective sprayer missed part of the field is "injury" to property).
107. See Wendorff, supra note 19, at 254.
108. Neither the 1973 policy form nor the often-cited 1974 Defense Research
Institute analysis of the policy mentions incorporation of defective products. See DRI,
supra note 40, at 2-33.
109. The 1973 CGL policy contains no fewer than 17 exclusions. DRI, supra note
40, at 13. CGL coverage is excluded, for instance, when an insured's "mobile equipment" (defined to include race cars, go-carts, snowmobiles) is used for racing or stunts.
Id. at 14. Coverage is also excluded when a named insured, by its delay or lack of performance on a contract or the failure of its own products, causes loss of use of certain
tangible property. Id. at 16.
Among the least factious of the exclusions is Exclusion (g), the war exclusion, which
says the CGL does not apply:
[T]o bodily injury or property damage due to war, whether or not declared, civil
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an integral part of CGL coverage, because the policies presume coverage unless a risk is specifically excluded." °
If not through a new policy exclusion, how could the coverage for
incorporation of defective products that existed under the 1966 language have been eliminated? As explained above, this change came
from the courts, which since the late 1970s have held that by qualifying "injury" with "physical," the 1973 policy limited property damage
coverage to injuries that are predominantly physical."' Curiously,
though, this construction seems to have escaped insurance law commentators, who, shortly after the release of the 1973 policy, attempted
to predict its impact." 2 Moreover, some commentators and at least
one court have found this construction unconvincing.' 3 Thus the law
governing coverage of incorporation damage under the post-1973
policies has been shaped by the courts alone, and in contradiction to
the ostensible intent of the industry that created the policies.
B. What Did Hauenstein Really Say?
Confusion over the incorporation issue can be also traced in part to
misinterpretation of the Hauensteincase, which still seems to influence
much thinking and writing. The problem stems from the Hauenstein
court's implication that diminution of the market value of a larger entity
war, insurrection, rebellion or revolution or to any act or condition incident to
any of the foregoing with respect to (1) liability assumed by the insured under
an incidental contract, or (2) expenses for first aid under the Supplementary
Payments provision ....
Tinker, supra note 5, at 302 (emphasis deleted from original).
Probably the most debated CGL exclusion is Exclusion (f), the environmental pollution exclusion, added to the standard form in 1973, which excludes CGL coverage for:
[B]odily injury or property damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals,
liquids or gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants
into or upon land, the atmosphere or any water course or body of water ....
DRI, supra note 40, at 25. This exclusion does not apply if such discharge, dispersal, release, or escape is sudden and accidental. Id. See generally Salisbury, supra note 16
(discussing the "pollution exclusion" appearing in the CGL); Tyler & Wilcox, supra
note 25 (analyzing the pollution exclusion's effectiveness in avoiding coverage for environmental damage claims); S. Hollis M. Greenlaw, Note, The CGL Policy and the
Pollution Exclusion Clause: Using the Drafting History to Raise the Interpretation Out
of the Quagmire, 23 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 233 (1990) (examining the drafting
history and three judicial interpretations of the pollution exclusion).
I 10. See supra note 24.
111. See supra notes 66-82 and accompanying text.
11 2. See, e.g., DRI, supra note 40; Tinker, supra note 5. Neither of these commentators predicted that the new definition would affect or eliminate coverage of incorporation
damage.
113. See supra notes 101-02.
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is both property damage in and of itself and a measure of the damage
done by incorporating a defective product." 4 Although courts and
commentators influenced by Hauenstein commonly speak of "diminution in value" as CGL-covered property damage," 5 that construction is
logically and intuitively unsound." 6
Such "coverage" would actually be an empty gesture. Consider the
following: Because substantive tort law largely prohibits defective
product purchasers from recovering for pure economic loss, a manufacturer will likely incur liability for such loss, if at all, only in contract. 117 But since Geddes & Smith in 1959, courts have repeatedly
114. For text of the confusing language and examples of conflicting interpretations,
see supra notes 52-53.
115. See, e.g., Vasichek, supra note 101, at 813 n.90 (stating that "diminution in
value clearly constituted 'property damage' under the 1966 revisions").
1 16. A federal district court judge commented as follows on the contention that
diminution of value can itself constitute property damage:
[Plaintiffs] theory (and that of its supporting authorities) of property damage,
that is, that where an occurrence results in a diminution in market value of tangible property, there one has property damage, falls of its own weight.
Assume real property, say a dwelling house, belonging to a governor of a
State. Real estate agents will readily and properly testify that such property is
increased in market value because its seller would be a governor. Assume the
governor is impeached. This occurrence (or its basis) would result in a diminution of the fair market value of the dwelling. Aside from the question of liability, [plaintiff] would have to argue that the impeachment resulted in property
damage, as it defines that term in its brief. Indeed, under [plaintiffs] argument, any occurrence, be it a raise in interest rates, a war, or a strike in a
dominant industry, which diminishes property values, meets the definition
sought to be imposed by [plaintiff]. Such coverage could not have been contemplated by the parties.
Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp. v. American Motorist Ins. Co., 458 F. Supp. 792, 796 n.1
(E.D. Va. 1978).
To further illustrate this distinction, consider the case of the owner of an office building who has just discovered that in 1950 great quantities of asbestos insulation were installed around the pipes. If incorporation of a defective product is property damage, then
the building was initially damaged 43 years ago. But if declining market value is the deciding factor, there has been no property damage (assuming that no one knew of the
asbestos before the owner). In fact, under the diminution in value scheme, property
damage would only occur when the local real estate market learns of the asbestos, perhaps in next week's newspapers, perhaps when the building is sold, perhaps never.
117. "Pure economic loss," which is generally not recoverable in a negligence
action, is defined as a "financial loss which is not causally consequent upon physical injury to the plaintiffs own person or property." BRUCE FELDTHUSEN, ECONOMIC
NEGLIGENCE 1 (2d ed. 1989). By contrast, "consequential economic loss" is defined as
financial loss that is causally consequent on physical damage. Id.
Prosser and Keeton observe that traditionally, product purchasers could not recover for
"intangible commercial loss" in negligence or strict liability, and that the few cases
allowing such recovery would most properly be treated as sounding in contract. W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS 708 (5th ed. 1984). They note also that product purchasers who are victims of intentional torts such as fraud may recover intangible
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held that the CGL policy language covers property damage liability
only if the liability sounds in tort... 8 So a CGL policy that purports to
cover diminution, which can be pure economic loss,"

9

as "property

damage," thereby purports to cover a tort "liability" with little or no
basis in law. The CGL drafters were not likely to have set out to
create such a policy. 2
In contrast, it is rudimentary that an insured can be liable in tort for
actually physically damaging property and thereby causing its value to
fall. 12' Knowing this, reasonable parties to an insurance contract are
far more likely to consider diminished value to be a measure of damages rather than damage itself. 22 Accordingly, Hauenstein and its
progeny are best understood to stand for the proposition that diminution in3 market value is a measure of property damage, not damage itself.

12

commercial losses. Id. But the typical incorporation suit will not involve intentional
wrongdoing.
See also Stone & Webster, 458 F. Supp. at 796 n.l (suggesting that it is unlikely that
an insured will be held liable for mere property value decline).
118. See, e.g., Geddes & Smith, 334 P.2d at 885; Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v.
Spancrete of Ill., Inc., 726 F. Supp. 204, 206 (N.D. Il. 1989); Continental Ins. Co. v.
Bussell, 498 P.2d 706, 710 (Alaska 1972); Aim Ins. Co. v. Culcasi, 280 Cal. Rptr. 766,
768 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Silva & Hill Constr. Co., Inc. v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins.
Co., 97 Cal. Rptr. 498, 504 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971); Boiler Brick and Refractory Co. v.
Maryland Casualty Co., 168 S.E.2d 100, 102 (Va. 1969); Action Ads, Inc. v. Great Am.
Ins. Co., 685 P.2d 42, 43-45 (Wyo. 1984). But see Olympic, Inc. v. Providence Wash.
Ins. Co. of Alaska, 648 P.2d 1008, 1012 n.8 (Alaska 1982) (holding that the CGL policy does not cover contract damages generally, but stating without citation or elaboration that "[a]n exception ... may arise" where a contract breach results in "injury to
persons or property").
119. See Stone & Webster, 458 F. Supp. at 796 n.l (demonstrating how diminished
market value can be pure economic loss).
120. See Eljer, 972 F.2d at 811 (stating there is "little demand" for liability insurance covering liability for causes of action that are not widely recognized).
121. See Eljer, 972 F.2d at 811 ("Under traditional tort law, if you hit a bridge and put
it out of commission, you are liable to the owner of the bridge ....).
122. To illustrate, in Missouri Terrazzo Co. v. Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 740 F.2d
647, 649 (8th Cir. 1984), a floor deteriorated after being improperly installed in a
supermarket. The company that installed the floor sought CGL coverage for its settlement with the supermarket, but the insurer denied coverage on the ground that diminution in value is not covered under the post-1973 definition of property damage. Id. The
court agreed with the insured flooring company that diminution in value is "merely a
means of measuring the damage sustained as a result of the property damage." Id. at 650.
123. See John P. Arness & Randall D. Eliason, Insurance Coverage for "Property
Damage" in Asbestos and Other Toxic Tort Cases, 72 VA. L. REV. 943, 953-55 (1986)
(reading Hauenstein to say that incorporation of a defective product, rather than decreased market value, constitutes the property damage). But see, Larry Spurgeon,
Determining the Scope of "Bodily Injury or Property Damage" Under the Comprehensive
General Liability Policy, 23 IDAHO L. REV. 379, 396 (1987) (stating that "Hauenstein is
the leading case for the proposition that diminished value of property is, in and of itself,
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The primary fault of the flawed "diminution is damage" view is that
it may lead courts to reflexively and incorrectly preclude coverage in
defective product incorporation cases. To illustrate, a court that views
diminution as damage will likely also classify it as intangible damage. 24 If the court further views the 1973 definition as eliminating
coverage for intangible damage, 25 the court could reflexively find no
coverage for incorporation claims. This fixation on diminution as intangible damage could divert the court's attention from where it properly should be: whether or not there was a physical injury. 126 If the
court instead took the correct view that diminution is the measure of
the damage caused when a defective product is incorporated into a
larger entity, and that such incorporation is a "physical injury," 27 the
court would then find incorporation damage covered under post-1973
policies.
V. PROPOSAL

The post-1973 CGL form should be read to cover damages from the
incorporation of defective products into larger entities. The primary
change made to the property damage definition in 1973-the addition
of the term "physical"-did not eliminate the coverage for incorporation damage held to exist under the pre-1973 policies. Rather, the
word "physical" in the post-1973 policies should be read to exclude
coverage for purely economic losses-losses which, unlike incorporation, involve no physical contact.
Granted, no one would seriously maintain that adding the word
"physical" to the 1973 definition of property damage had no effect. 28
property damage").
124. See, e.g., American Home. Assur. Co. v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 786 F.2d 22,
25 (1st Cir. 1986) (stating that under the 1973 definition "courts have held that intangible damages, such as diminution in value, are not considered property damage");
Wyoming Sawmills, 578 P.2d at 1256 (referring to depreciation in property value as
"intangible" damage).
125. See, e.g., American Home, 786 F.2d at 25 (stating that the 1973 CGL policy
drafters "expressly added the modifier 'physical' injury to the definition of 'property
damage' in order to restrict recovery for intangible losses"); Wyoming Sawmills, 578
P.2d at 1256 (stating that the only possible reason why the drafters added "physical" to
the 1973 definition was to exclude coverage for "consequential or intangible damage"
(quoting ROWLAND H. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 11.09 (1976))).
For discussion of the not unreasonable view that the 1973 policy eliminated coverage
of intangible or "pure economic" damages, see infra notes 132-49 and accompanying
text.
126. See infra note 144 (positing that defective product incorporation inherently involves physical contact).
127. See infra part V.
128. See OBRIST, supra note 105, at 40.
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"Physical" narrows coverage in some way by indicating that nonphysical injuries that were covered by previous policies will not be
covered. But the "physical" qualifier should not limit coverage to the
extent the courts have maintained. Rather, the proper interpretation of
the "physical" limitation is rooted in the long-recognized distinction in
tort law between liability for economic losses involving some physical
injury, and economic losses involving no physical injury. 129 Such is
the line the drafters of the 1973 policy apparently intended to draw.
Tort law recognizes a general duty to refrain from acts that unreasonably threaten physical injury or property damage.13° But there is
no general duty of care, and hence no ground for recovery, when the
threatened harm is entirely economic. 13 ' This requirement of physical
injury plays 1an important role in restricting recovery for "pure economic lOss., 32
There is perhaps no better illustration of this point than the famous
case of In Re Petition of Kinsman Transit Co. 133 In Kinsman, a ship
broke free from its river mooring and struck another ship, causing the
second ship's mooring to break also. 134 The two ships continued
down the river together, striking a bridge, starting an ice jam, and ultimately causing a flood that disrupted river traffic. 35 The court
allowed claims by an owner of property damaged by the flood on the
ground that such damage was reasonably foreseeable. 136 But the court
rejected claims based on disruptions in cargo unloading, stressing that
129. As one commentator put it:
Despite the broad scope of the general rule restricting liability for the economic consequences of negligence, there are circumstances in which courts do
impose such liability. The most common circumstance in which courts permit
recovery of economic loss is where there is also some physical injury. Indeed,
a common statement of the general rule is that there can be no recovery for
economic loss in the absence of some physical injury.
David B. Gaebler, Negligence, Economic Loss, and the U.C.C., 61 IND. L.J. 593, 602
(1986).
130. See In re Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708, 723-25 (2d Cir. 1964)
(holding that this general duty of care extends to all consequences, even the novel or remote).
131. See Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM. L.
REV. 917, 944 (1966) [hereinafter Economic Loss].
13 2. See FELDTHUSEN, supra note 117, at 1.
133. There are two Kinsman decisions, In re Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 338
F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964) [hereinafter Kinsman I] and Kinsman Transit Co. v. City of
Buffalo, 388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968) [hereinafter Kinsman Ill. For a discussion of
Kinsman Transit, on which the discussion herein is based, see FELDTHUSEN, supra note
117, at 218-21.
134. Kinsman I, 338 F.2d at 712.
135. Id. at 713; Kinsman II, 388 F.2d at 822.
136. Kinsman 1, 338 F.2d at 723.
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they were too "remote and indirect,"'' 37 and that as a practical matter,
recovery needed to be limited.139 38 Commentators have since invoked
this same pragmatic principle.
The significance of Kinsman is that the limited tort recovery it embraced parallels the coverage limits the insurance industry has built into
CGL policies.' 4° Achieving Kinsman-like limits on insurance coverages is therefore a likely impetus for the 1973 change in the property

137. Kinsman I1,388 F.2d at 824.
138. Id. at 825 n.8.
139. See, e.g., Fleming James, Jr., Limitations on Liability for Economic Loss
Caused by Negligence: A Pragmatic Appraisal, 25 VAND. L. REV. 43, 45 (1972)
(asserting that the physical consequences of liability are usually limited but the indirect
repercussions of negligence may be unacceptably open-ended).
Another commentator observed:
The physical consequences of an automobile accident, for example, are necessarily restricted to persons and property within some limited physical proximity. However, no such inherent limitation exists with respect to the economic
consequences. Instead, the physical injuries suffered by the initial victims
could set off a chain reaction of economic repercussions extending to an unlimited number of parties. As a result, liability for the economic consequences
of negligence raises the fear of "liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class."
Gaebler, supra note 129, at 612 (quoting Judge Cardozo's famous formulation in
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931)).
140. In a discussion of East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S.
858 (1986), one commentator recently wrote:
While it is true that the principles that determine whether particular losses
qualify as tort damages are not coterminous with principles that determine
whether losses are insured under liability policies, there is nonetheless a close
parallel between those principles. This parallel can clearly be seen in the following standard CGL exclusion:
[Coverage doe not extend to] loss of use of tangible property which
has not been physically injured or destroyed resulting from (1) a delay in or lack of performance by or on behalf of the Named Insured of
any contract or agreement, or (2) the failure of the Named Insured's
products or work performed by or on behalf of the Named Insured to
meet the level of performance, quality, fitness or durability warranted
or represented by the Named Insured; but this exclusion does not apply to loss of use of other tangible property resulting from the
sudden and accidental physical injury to or destruction of the Named
Insured's products or work performed by or on behalf of the Named
Insured after such products or work have been put to use by any person or organization other than an Insured.
As the Supreme Court noted in Delaval, 106 S.Ct. at 2301 .... one of the intermediate positions [between allowing recovery for all economic losses and
no economic losses] ... would allow a tort recovery for damage to the product
itself and for loss of use of other [tangible] property if the damage is sudden.
Ed Bluestein, Jr., Damages in Maritime Products Liability Cases, 62 TUL. L. REV. 511,
541 n.146 (1988); see also Eljer, 972 F.2d at 811-12.
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damage definition. 4 ' Indeed, court rulings have directly influenced
the drafting of CGL policies in other contexts, 142 and insurers have
avoided extending coverage to liability for consequential economic
losses such as those held non-actionable in Kinsman. 43 In fact, insurers may even consider pure economic losses too "elusive" to cover
at all."445 At the very least, economic losses can be very difficult to insure. 1
Furthermore, CGL policy drafters have previously restricted coverage of pure economic losses by altering the policy definitions section.' 4 As discussed above, in 1966 the drafters inserted the qualifier
"tangible" before the term "property."'' 47 This came in the wake of
courts interpreting the unqualified term expansively, concluding for
example that if unqualified, "property" can reasonably include "obligations, rights and other intangibles."'' 48 By requiring damage to "tangible" property in the 1966 form, the insurance industry effectively
precluded courts from finding coverage for injury to productivity,

141. See Eljer, 972 F.2d at 811 (stating that the structure of the 1973 definition may
have been influenced by substantive tort law).
142. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
143. See Economic Loss, supra note 131, at 955 (suggesting that product policy exclusions for various unspecified forms of economic losses indicate an unwillingness to
underwrite such risks).
144. One commentator has noted "[tlhe feeling [in the insurance industry] is that
claims based on loss of profits, loss of good will, loss of business reputation, etc., are
too elusive and illusory to be the proper subject of insurance, at least if not associated
with property damage [involving actual physical damage] to tangible property." Ray H.
Anderson, Current Problems in Products Liability Law and Products Liability Insurance,
31 INS. COUNS. J. 436, 446 (1964).
145. Insurers rely heavily on their ability to predict losses accurately. Vasichek,
supra note 101, at 802 n.30. Economic losses are very difficult to predict. Economic
Loss, supra note 131, at 956. Losses can vary markedly depending on the size and nature of the ultimate user. Defective circuit breakers, for example, could cause far more
loss of profit for a major electrical utility than for a small retailer. Id.
146. Vasichek, supra note 101, at 801-803. Although new definitions have in fact
restricted coverage, finding direct evidence of the drafters' intent is a painstaking and
complex matter. As already noted, insurance companies concede that materials relating
to drafting history are not published or released, and their content can thus only be ascertained by deposing the drafters. See supra note 99. This allows insurers to play both
sides of the fence. On the one hand, insurers know that deposing drafters or otherwise
acquiring first-hand evidence can be cost-prohibitive. On the other hand, insurers can
attack secondary sources, even those widely used and generally accepted, as irrelevant to
the drafting. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States
at 17-18, Eljer Mfg. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 972 F.2d 805 (7th Cir. 1992) (No. 921312).
147. OBRIST, supra note 105, at 40.
148. Wells Labberton v. General Casualty Co., 332 P.2d 250, 254 (Wash. 1958)
(quoting Citizens State Bank v. Vidal, 114 F.2d 380, 382 (10th Cir. 1940)).
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copyrights, and other purely economic interests.149
Nevertheless, the 1966 definition still left insurers potentially liable
for pure economic losses as long as "tangible" property was injured. 50
So in 1973 insurers had a strong incentive to try to reduce their exposure to such losses by requiring physical contact in cases of property
damage. In fact, nearly a decade earlier, one commentator had suggested adding "physical" to the CGL property damage definition to reduce insurer exposure to tangential economic losses. 5 ' All this leads
to the conclusion that rather than attempting to eliminate incorporation
coverage, the 1973 drafters, like the 1966 drafters, were trying to restrict coverage of pure economic losses.
149. See Tarpey, supra note 34, at 227 (stating that the tangible property requirement "apparently is designed to exclude liability for certain consequential damages, such
as loss of profits, goodwill, as well as damage to other intangible property, such as
patents, trade names, trade secrets, etc."); Wendorff, supra note 19, at 255 (allowing that
the tangible property definition will preclude coverage for loss of profits, lost goodwill
and other economic losses, but arguing that insurers never intended to cover those
losses anyway); Vasichek, supra note 101, at 802 n.30 (stating that "[t]he insurance industry's decision to avoid further application of the Labberton 'obligations, rights and
other intangibles' reasoning is understandable").
150. Vasichek, supra note 101, at 801. To illustrate how this worked, consider the
recent spate of syringes allegedly found in soft drink cans. "Tangible" property was
harmed immediately: millions of cans were rendered unfit for sale. But another nonphysical injury, that being to the drink manufacturer's good name, presented potential
for tremendous pure economic losses.
15 1. See Anderson, supra note 144, at 446. Examining Anderson's thinking in detail
should help reassure skeptical readers that the reading of physical this Comment proposes is not some law school flight of fancy. Anderson was an assistant counsel at
Employers Mutual of Wausau and wrote this article in 1964 for an audience of other insurance company lawyers. Toward the end of his state-of-the-field article he detailed
some reservations that insurance companies had about three separate liability scenarios,
each apparently a combination of the real and the hypothetical. Id.
In the first, a neighborhood tavern was ultimately put out of business after a customer
found a dead mouse in his beer bottle and spread the word about his misfortune. Id.
Obviously a defective product, but no physical damage to anything but the product itself.
In the second, a boat motor broke down, and by the time the commercial fisherman
could get it repaired, he had missed most of the fishing season. Id. Again, defective
product, but no physical damage to anything but the product itself.
The third case involved a company that made fire extinguishers. An extinguisher sold
to a boat owner failed to operate, not causing any physical damage itself but permitting
fire to consume the boat. Id.
Anderson asserted that all that would be needed to make clear that CGL policies did not
cover such damage would be to insert "physical" before "damage to tangible property."
Id. This is not to suggest that Anderson's position squares completely with the views in
this Comment. In fact, Anderson maintained that adding "physical" would preclude coverage in the boat motor example-a clear case of defective product incorporation. This
comment does suggest, however, that "physical injury" was understood by some in the
insurance industry as far back as 1964 as a way to limit coverage for economic losses
like lost good will and lost profits.
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The best-reasoned interpretation of the post-1973 policies, then, is
that they provide coverage when there is some physical contact and
restrict coverage only when there is none. 152 Physical contact ought to
be the deciding factor. Incorporation of a defective product into153a
larger entity is virtually certain to involve physical contact.
Accordingly, incorporation of a defective product should be covered
property damage under the post-1973 policies.
Insurance companies will no doubt argue that this reading of the
property damage definition renders "physical" meaningless as a qualifier to "injury." But the reading advocated here will still screen out
some of the more tangential injuries that insurance companies had to
cover under the 1966 definition' 54 and sought to avoid covering with
the 1973 definition. This reading will also preserve exclusion of coverage for "injuries" that are essentially lost investment opportunities or
pure diminution in value. 55 Under this reading, then, "physical" is
152. This distinction animated much of the dispute between the majority and dissenting opinions in Eljer, supra notes 84-99.
153. Contact is "the touching of two objects or surfaces." WEBSTER'S NEW RIVERSIDE
DICTIONARY 303 (2d ed. 1988). To incorporate is "to unite with or introduce into something already existent [usually] so as to form an indistinguishable whole that cannot be
restored to the previously separate elements without damage." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1145 (unabridged 1986). These definitions confirm what
common sense suggests: Incorporation of a defective product into another entity consists of a physical union achieved through physical contact. See also ElIjer, 972 F.2d at
810 (observing that the 1973 CGL policy was meant to cover liability resulting "from
physical contact . . . as when a potentially dangerous product is incorporated into another" and to preserve coverage of cases involving "physical touching, as where a defective water system is installed in a house").
So under this reading, an insured would be covered under a post-1973 CGL policy for
liability for lost income and profits caused by defects in a glass curtain wall installed by
the insured, as in Continental Casualty Co. v. Gilbane Bldg. Co., 461 N.E.2d 209, 212
(Mass. 1984). But coverage would not extend to liability for costly delays, lost financing, and lost investment opportunities caused by an architectural firm insured failing to
provide proper cost estimates or documentation, as in Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v.
Case Found. Co., 294 N.E.2d 7, 12 (I11.
App. Ct. 1973). Nor would the post-1973 policy cover lost fees and added repair costs related to an insured abandoning a railroad rehabilitation contract, as in SLA Property Management v. Angelina Casualty Co., 856
F.2d 69, 72 (8th Cir. 1988), or lost profits and good will incurred when dairy creamers
sold by an insured to a restaurant turned "sour, spoiled and unpalatable," as in Liberty
Mut. v. Consolidated Milk Producers' Ass'n, 354 F. Supp. 879, 881 (D.N.H. 1973).
154. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
155. See, e.g., Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Case Found. Co., 294 N.E.2d 7 (I11.
App. Ct. 1973). In this case, several insureds (including an architectural firm and contractors) sought CGL coverage to defend a negligence suit by the developer of the John
Hancock Center. Id. at 9. The court rejected the insureds' argument that the developer's
losses of investment and anticipated profits caused by the insureds' delays were "injuries" covered by the CGL. Id. at 13-14. Granted, this damage was quintessentially
economic and the court denied coverage even under the 1966 wording ("injury to or destruction of property"), but the case illustrates the nature of injuries properly excluded as
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anything but meaningless.
VI. CONCLUSION
Insurers responded to increasingly costly interpretations of the CGL
policy by restricting the definition of "property damage" in 1973.
Insurers appear to have been understandably attempting to reduce their
nearly limitless potential exposure to pure economic losses. But insurers did not act to withdraw coverage for the incorporation of defective
products. Until they do, the courts should not act for them.
Incorporation of defective products ought to be recognized as covered
property damage under the post-1973 CGL policy.
TIMOTHY STANTON

non-physical.

